UA V Ad hoc NETworks (UAANETs) can be defmed as a new form of ad hoc networks in which nodes are Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Ground Control Station (GCS). Compared to the usual Mobile Ad hoc NETwork (MANET), this new network paradigm has some unique features and brings specific challenges such as node mobility degree, network connectivity patterns, delay-sensitive applications and network security. Indeed, from rout ing point of view, none of the several UAANET routing protocols proposed in the literature have been designed with security in mind. This lack of con sideration can make the certification of UAANETs difficult to obtain. In this paper, we present our vision of such a challenge and the research that we are conducting. The aim is to propose an original secure routing protocol for UAANETs using a Model Driven Development (MDD) approach which will ease the certification of final UA V products. The first prelim inary results concerning our secure-routing protocol design will be presented. This paper describes our ongoing research which will provide secure commu nications for U A V ad hoc networks at the end of the SUANET (Secure Uav Ad-hoc NETwork) project.
Introduction
An Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) is a pi lotless aerial vehicle which can be controlled either autonomously by on-board computers or remotely controlled by a pilot. When several UAVs are com municating with each other via wireless links, they dynamically form a temporary multi-hop radio net work called UA V Ad hoc Network (UAANET). In UAANETs, the relatively low number of UA Vs, their high mobility and frequently changing topology challenge network connectivity and differentiate them 978-1-4799-8940-9/15/$31.00 ©2015 IEEE from usual Mobile Ad hoc NETworks (MANETs). These characteristics induce difficult challenges for building a reliable and secure communication archi tecture solution.
It is worthwhile to underline that some commu nication architectures [1, 2] have been proposed by the UA Vs research community for UAANET, but only few of them have been designed to provide defense against malicious attackers. Further, among the UAANET routing protocols that have been pro posed in the literature, none have been designed with security consideration. The majority of works related to UAANET rather focused on performance enhancements. Typically, it is important to mention that there are also some ongoing Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) project carried by NASA and the FAA related to security architecture but these works are direct architecture oriented and do not tackled ad hoc communication.
Additionally, due to some specific features (de scribed in detail in Section II) which differentiate UAANETs from other MANETs, implementing a secure communication architecture has become a daunting task. An example of such a challenge is the resource constraints (e.g, very low communication throughput) and limited physical security l offered by the current UAANET communication infrastructure. Also, safety in UAANET is of major importance because typical civilian small UA Vs can be used as a weapon if hijacked. Thus, human lives can be at stake in case of security failures. It is therefore crucial to ensure that the control traffic cannot be either modified or deleted by an unauthorized entity during the mission.
Why Do We Need to Certify a UAANET ?
UAANET can be categorized as a sub-category of UAS. They are currently deployed in specific and separated airspaces from regular aircraft. Since they can be deployed in a wide range of civilian and military applications (e.g. aerial monitoring, vegeta tion encroachment monitoring, precision agriculture, etc.), they need to be integrated into the national airspace 3 in order to fully enable those applications. Nonetheless, their automated and unmanned charac teristics may render their deployment unauthorized by some aviation authorities. One way to overcome this obstacle is to certify each UAANET component (soft ware and hardware) by validating their efficiency and compliance to a standardized specification document. The objective is to develop a safe UAS to allow safe flight operations and to prevent hazards and safety risk.
Moreover, specifically in our work, it is impor tant to note that Delair-Tech company has already certified its DT -18 U A V to fly out of sight of the GCS. However, since the UAANET architecture im plies a modification of the communication system, a new certification is needed to ensure its safety requirements and risk management. Accordingly, our secure UAANET routing protocol must be subject of strict validation process. These processes include, but are not limited to:
• Validation of the specification requirements;
• Design and debugging of the source code;
• Test on the development machine by using a real simulation environment and using a flight 2 D. Tech, Delair-tech website, 2014 (accessed February 3, 2014) . [Online] . Available: http://www. delair-tech.com.
3 same airspace as regular aircraft simulator as physical data source;
• Test the binary on the embedded hardware on the ground;
• Flying test in sight and out of sight of the operator.
In our work, we considered such complexity by using a qualified tool for the communication software design. Given that, a UA V can only be certificated by the aviation authorities of the country where the main location of business of the UA V designer is located, we use a Model Driven Development (MDD) approach to be compliant with the French Civil Aviation Administration (DGAC 4 ) for the certi fication requirements to design our routing protocol. This methodology allows us to automatically generate source code with a certified auto-generator tool and to verify software compliance with a set formal verification tool (this design approach will be detailed in Section III).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe UAANETs specifications and their security requirements. In Section III, we describe our research collaboration with DELAIR-TECH com pany, then we provide an analysis of a potential secu rity architecture in Section IV. The first preliminary results related to our new secure routing protocol for UAANET will be described in Section V. Then, an enhancement proposition for UAV secure routing protocol is described in section VI. Finally, in Section VII, we provide our conclusions and an overview of our future research perspectives.
UAANET Communication Architecture and Security Principles
• Network connectivity: depending on the mobil ity degree, the connectivity between two UA Vs could be lost while they are transmitting crit ical information (e.g. control/command traffic).
Additionally, link quality inconsistency may also affect UAANET topology. Because of the UAV movements, variations of distance, and the pos sible presence of interference, link quality fluc tuates and may cause loss of connectivity and performance degeneration.
• Number of nodes: Compared to some MANETs (for instance VANET -Vehicular Ad hoc NET work), the node density in UAANETs is rela tively low because the high speed of a UA V help to quickly cover a restricted area. Consequently, a large number of UAVs is not required.
• Sufficient energy and storage: depending on their sizes, UA Vs are usually assumed to have more energy and computing power than nodes in MANETs. For instance, in wireless sensor networks, nodes are subject to power and storage limitations, which restrict the network lifetime. This issue is frequently not considered as a domi nant factor in UAANETs because the UAV itself is a source of electricity for the autopilot and payload infrastructure. As such, the energy used to fly the UA V is supposed to be much greater than the energy used to perfom networking.
• Mobility: The UAV mobility is specifically 3D based and quite different from other vehicles. Random Way Point (RWP) model is one of the most common ones used to simulate node movements in MANETs. It assumes that the path is chosen randomly. However, such pattern is not suitable for UAVs as they will navigate with a predefined direction based upon the mis sion. Therefore, the mobility model should be rebuilt from scratch. Accordingly, an innovative approach has been proposed in [4] where authors provided a mobility pattern for UAVs based on real traces.
• Propagation model: in V ANETs and MANETs, the propagation model is not free of obstacles as nodes are moving close to the ground. In contrast, a Line of Sight (LOS) usually exists in UAANET environments. However, as stated in [3] , the propagation model depends on several factors such as the variation in communication distance, the ground reflection effects and weather conditions.
• Strict delay constraints: generally, UAANETs are used for real-time application such as, aerial photography and video capture in case of remote monitoring and environmental measurements. In addition, UAS related information are also ex changed within UAANET. This information in clude, but not limited to the configuration traf fics (GCS initialization, camera settings, GPS settings, etc .. ); the hearbeat messages (used to acknowledge a bidirectional connection between the UAVs and the GCS); the UAV Georeferenc ing traffic and the control/command traffic.
Ronting for UAANETs
In order to achieve UAANET missions, UA Vs must relay control and data traffic between them to the GCS. Consequently, an adapted UAANET routing protocol is required to find routes between nodes. The UAANET specific features detailed in section II-A impacts the routing protocol performance. For instance, mobility property has an important influence on the outcome of UAANET routing protocol. Since UAVs have a 3D based mobility, there is a high likelihood that the network topology changes more often. Accordingly, the UAANET routing protocol must be reactive enough to follow the network topol ogy changes. It is important to mention that UA V mobility is a dedicated research topic and not tackled in this paper.
Typically, several dynamic routing mechanisms are available for UAANETs in the Iitterature. In [5] , we have categorized them into four main categories such as proactive, reactive, hybrid and geographical routing.
Furthermore, several types of links can be de ployed between flying UAVs and the GCS. For instance, two links can be used respecively for the control traffics (associated with the autopilot) and for the payload traffics (associated with the payload hardware(e.g. RGB camera)). This means that mul tiple routes can be found if necessary. Nonetheless, note that for safety reason and to avoid interference between traffics, it is recommended to dedicate a link for the control and command traffics [6] .
4A5-3

UAANET Security Requirement
UAANET security is necessary to verify that nodes are trustworthy before exchanging data packets. It also ensure that no malicious entity can disturb the transmission of data messages during UAANET mission. This means that before deploying UAANET, we have to make sure that the control and command traffics; and the pay load traffic cannot be either modified or deleted by an attacker.
Furthermore, security services of UAANETs are not different from other networks. The aim is al ways to ensure the five security services: authenti cation, integrity, confidentiality, availability and non repudiation. Without authentication, an attacker could masquerade a UAV, thus being able to have unautho rized access to the resources and secret information, and may overtake the control of the network. Like wise, without integrity, an adversary could manipulate critical data by insertion, deletion or modification. Confidentiality ensures that information content is never revealed to entities that are not authorized to receive it. The non-repudiation service refers to a property that entities in the network cannot deny send ing or receiving a message. Availability guarantees that all of the services provided by the system are always available.
Moreover, the deployment of an exhaustive se curity system for UAANET is not an easy task as there are several challenges and security breaches to overcome. Indeed, in addition to classical network security issues, the specific features of UAANETs mentioned above raise additional challenges. For in stance, due to UAANET intermittent connectivity and UA V movements, it is difficult to perform a reliable formation flight S for small UA Vs. Also, deploying a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to handle crypto graphic keys is an obstacle to overcome. Indeed, the high mobility of UAV nodes and the low air-ground network resources require us to develop a specific PKI solution for UAANETs.
Routing Attacks on UAANETs
UAANETs are vulnerable to many attacks. These attacks could occur on any layer of the protocol stack. This section focuses solely on attacks targeting the communication system (i.e, the network layer) since it is part of our research project specifications (the SUANET project collaboration will be described in more detail in the next section).
The purpose of attacks targeting the network layer consist in absorbing and controlling network traffic, disrupting the routing function and injecting malicious nodes. A diversity of attacks in MANET environment have been extensively described III the literature. Since UAANET is a subcategory of MANET, these attacks could well be applied III UAANETs.
Typically, an extended description of the worm hole attack [7] is described in Figure 1 to illustrate the needs of the security mechanisms in UAANETs. We have decided to highlight this attack since it is es pecially sophisticated and makes vulnerable different types of existing routing protocol in MANET. The wormhole attack involves two attackers who perform a colluding attack. One attacker record packets at a particular location and replay them at another attacker by using a high-speed private network. As a result, a UA V could unconsciously decide to forward traffic through the corrupt route to seek better performance. Consequently, all traffic sent from the GCS to the UAV4 which are supposed to go through UAVl and UA V2 will end up captured by the two attackers. Note that, once this collaborative attack successfully performed, it gives the attacker nodes a possibility for future attacks (for instance route disruptions or traffic unauthorized access, etc.). Obviously, to avoid such attack within UAANETs, the different UAVs needs to deploy an efficient authentication security mechanism that provides a strong authentication between each other. This ensures that only authenticated UAVs are able to participate on routing information. Thus, the attackers (attacker nodes l and 2) cannot prove their identity and will not be able to communicate with the different UAVs.
Moreover, a classification is necessary to under stand UAANET attacks. In the following, we will classifY them based on the basic routing function alities to illustrate the attack targeting the different exchanged traffic between UAVs: route discovery attacks (category I) and data forwarding attacks (cate gory II). Accordingly, the first category (left of Figure  2 ) refers to the attacks which could harm the traffic control, while the second category (right of Figure Figure 
The Wormhole Attack Process
2) is relevant to the payload traffic (image and (real time) video traffic for instance). We consider that a corrupted configuration packet could have a signif icant impact on the entire UAS because it directly corrupts the route finding process. Hence, if route discovery is somehow disrupted, the other steps is no longer reliable. Likewise, the second category of attacks has an impact essentially on network perfor mances. These potential attacks happen only after the route finding process, which can therefore be detected by a security mechanism. For instance, with a hash chain mechanism which allows each node to verify the integrity of a message hop count, a node is able to detect a forged message and recognize if the message has been originated or forwarded from an untrusted node.
Routing attacks
Route discovery attacks
Wormhole attacks -:
Rushing attacks -: 
Security Related Work
The major motivation that led us to conduct this work is to provide a secure routing protocol for UAANETs that satisfy at the same time the UAANET specific features, the security network requirements and U AS certification requirements. To the best of our knowledge, there is no previous paper that has proposed a validated and secure routing protocol for UAANETs. Nevertheless, there are some papers that can be considered to be among the first works in the field of U AS security.
Among these papers, we quote [8] , in which Akram et ai, were interested in protecting UAS control and command traffics by using new specific embedded secure elements. Their position paper de scribes a possible adversaries requirement and pro pose theoretical solutions that can meet these require ments.
In paper [9] , Butcher et al. assess the vulnera bility of Mavlink protocol 6 for command and control of unmanned aircraft. They proved that these traffics can be defenseless against attacks targeting confiden tiality, integrity and availability attacks.
In papers [10, 11] respective I of Javaid and Kim and their co-authors, details various possible Cyber attacks against UAANET network. They conclude that the weakest point of UAANET security is its use of wireless communication channels which enable attacks not only from aerial intruders flying in the coverage zone but also a ground based adversaries equipped with a powerful antenna.
All of these papers reinforces the idea of major importance of securing U AS communication. Despite such rise of interest, the research in the field of UAANET security is currently in its early stages. The next section will detail a project that we are currently working on. The aim is to propose a secure ad hoc communication architecture for UAVs.
SVANET: Secure VA V Ad Hoc Network
Research Collaboration Context
Our work is part of a scientific collaboration be tween the French company Delair-Tech and ENAC (the French Civil Aviation University), funded by the French scientific foundation ANRT 7 . The aim is to define and implement a secure architecture for U AANETs. research objectives we would I ike to achieve. The first objective is to define a key management mechanism to enable deployment of multiple keys which will be used to implement authentication, confidentiality and integrity services. We focused solely on these three security at tributes as they are sufficient to ensure the security of the communication between UAVs.
The second objective is to design a new secure routing protocol for UAANETs in order to guarantee that all UA Vs collaborating in the routing process are authenticated and able to find the shortest path toward the destination quickly and efficiently. The routing algorithm will rely on the key distribution protocol defined in the first step. Note that the solution has to induce the minimum signaling overhead in order to preserve network resources for effective data ex change between U A V s.
Lastly, the third contribution will be the design of an additional mechanism to secure data commu nications between a pair of entities. This security extension would probably need to be added onto a layer other than the network layer (the application layer for instance).
These different security solutions assume that a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is available in the network. Air-ground PKI is a dedicated research field and we will not describe it in this paper. In this paper, we assume that a dedicated PKI is deployed in the network and reachable by each UAV. The considered application scenario is an emer gency situation where the UAANET is used to cover a geographical area using remote monitoring. As shown in Figure 4 , the scenario involves 3 UAVs (DTl, DT2 and DT3) communicating with each other. In the beginning, the three UAVs are moving in accordance with their flight plans while being connected to the GCS. We then assume that based on the mission plan update, the node DT3 has to move into another location to cover a specific geographic zone. Its com munications are then impossible with the GCS due to the loss of coverage (inducing a disconnection). Additionally, we assume that an obstacle prevents a direct connectivity between DT3 and the GCS. In this case, DTl and DT2 act as relays to ensure communications towards the GCS. The monitoring data are therefore exchanged between DT3 and the GCS through DTl and DT2.
Secure Routing UAANET Protocol: a Model Driven Development approach
To act as autonomous systems (without a dedi cated safety pilot) or to be simply authorized to fly in general airspace, U AANET needs to be certified before deployment 8 . In this context, we focus on the certification for the final software of our communi cation system and use a Model-Driven Development (MDD) approach in our design process. The main advantage of MDD approaches is to bring less error prone properties and to lead to a higher quality and 4A5-6 meaningful validation [12] of the fmal embedded software.
MDD is a paradigm in software development which claims the use of models as primary artifacts in the development process. A system model is the focus of the development process, from requirements spec ification, development through model design, sim ulation testing and integration. Additionally, MDD allows us to generate high-level code in order to verify and to test the coverage of the model and therefore the conformance in line with the project requirements. It also allows us to create unitary tests and execute model-and-code consistency checking for system verification purposes.
In order to do so, we use the Matlab Simulink framework which is a modern tool for domain expert's development of the system model. This software system will be integrated directly into the ARM board of the UA V in order to automatically generate a C/C++ code. Figure 5 shows how we used the MDD approach to design a secure routing protocol for UAANETs. Figure 6 gives detailed information about the different Matlab Simulink and ad hoc tools used to produce the final binary. The modeling process begins with the design of the routing protocol with Matlab Simulink. The next step is to add a set of security mechanisms in order to obtain a secure protocol. Based on the modeling results, the automatic generation feature provided by Simulink is used to get the source code. Moreover, Matlab Simulink provides full automatic test procedures that improve the design of our secure routing protocol model. For instance, they provide automatic logical coverage verification procedures which increase the robustness of the final software. The validation procedures are then eased and final binary tests will be less numerous (this is investigated further in Section VI).
SUANET secure routing protocol selec tion process
In this section, we focus on the design of the new secure routing protocol for UAANETs. The first part of this design was dedicated to a selection process which has been divided into three complementary studies:
1) Survey of existing UAANET routing protocols and selection of the best performing ones;
• Routing protocol specification modeling
Security mechanism
Secure routing protocol specification modeling
Model
Code
The main objective of this selection process has been to consider the most performing routing protocol which exists in the MANET field. This protocol will be the starting point of the new secure routing protocol that we plan to propose. These three steps of the selection process are described below.
Survey and Evaluation of Existing UAANET Routing Protocols
Most of the current UAANET routing protocols are extensions of well-known MANET routing pro tocols such as Ad hoc On demand Distance Vector (AODV) [13] , Optimized Link State Routing pro tocols (OLSR) [14] and Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) [15] . Accordingly, we conducted an in-depth study of each UAANET routing protocol and we compared them based on their concordance with the SUANET requirements and performances in terms of end-to-end delay, overhead and packet delivery ratio.
Based on our survey, it seems that the Reactive Greedy-Reactive (RGR) protocol [16] would provide better performances than any other existing protocols for UAANET. RGR combines both reactive routing AODV and geographic routing mechanisms. It uses location information as well as reactive end-to-end paths in the route selection process.
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Emulation Testbed Results
As explained above, among the existing UAANET routing protocols in the literature, RGR appeared to best fit our requirements in terms of specifications and performances. This leads us to start with AODV as a starting point of our protocol design. However, RGR testbed environments are different from what we would have in the SUANET use case (see Figure 4 for more detail). Indeed, RGR protocol was implemented in OPNET Modeler and tested with unrealistic test parameters such as a low degree of mobility, several nodes and a non real-time traffic.
The choice to directly select a routing protocol based on RGR performance evaluation results is not enough to justify our selection. Therefore, we performed an evaluation performance with a hybrid tool that com bined emulation and simulation testbeds. This tool is created during SUANET project and was presented in a different paper [5] . It helped us to emulate a real UAANET experimental scenario (chosen in the SUANET project and described in Figure 4) as closely as possible and use a realistic mobility model 9 as a physical data source. Accordingly, emulation results are shown in Ta ble 1. We can see that AODV has better performance while DSR performance drops because of a large overhead and OLSR performance drops also because of a significant increase of the retrieval time. The value of the end-to-end delay and the retrieval time in case of route failure are particularly important to the SUANET requirements because of the real time constraints of the data traffic exchanged in this project (for instance video monitoring in real time of devastated geographical areas). 
Security Robustness Selection
Our security architecture starts with the creation of a new secure routing protocol for UAVs. We aim at providing a robust solution to face the maximum number of attacks and to guarantee security services (authentication, integrity and confidentiality).
Furthermore, since UAANET can be seen as sub category of MANET, we can consider the state of the art of security attacks for MANET as a starting point for our security robustness evaluation. The reason for such an interest is the large number of existing attacks for this environment as mentioned in Section II-C.
Security Context for Validation Purposes
In our network system model (depicted in Figure  7 ), we assume that UAVs and GCS are the only nodes within the network which are homogeneous. Further, we also consider that they come from the same manufacturer. This imply that, there will be no selfish node within UAANETs. Additionally, we also consider that the application data exchanged is a real time video traffic. As for energy consumption and computation capability, we would like to highlight that all nodes have a required amount of energy and need to be equipped with a powerful processor in order to run our cryptographic algorithm efficiently (presented in Section II).
In regards to attacker model, we assume that an attacker is capable of the following actions:
• Data traffic disclosure: the attacker can collect data traffic transmitted by UAVs such as the pay load traffic (e.g. video streams), GPS infor mation, heartbeat messages or UAV mobility way-points.
• Routing information disclosure: the attacker can obtain information related to the network such as routing information and/or topology information if the message confidentiality is not protected.
• Performance degradation: the attacker can de grade UAANET performance by rejecting delay sensitive traffic, or by adding extra delay during transmissions. An attacker can also add unnec essary traffic to slow the network.
• Topology modification: an attacker can also disrupt UAANET connectivity. This can be achieved by inserting an additional node or by invalidating a reliable link. An attacker can also forge false routing information and forward it within the U AANET.
• UA V exclusion (i.e. capture of one UA V by an attacker): an attacker can exclude UAVs from the network by inserting false routing informa tion or by modifYing routing metrics. Once a UA V is removed from the network, the attacker is able to take control of the U A V and perform other types of attacks.
Selection process criteria
Because of the real-time traffic exchanged in the SUANET project, the route finding process has to be The aim is to select the supporting algorithm criteria which is the most robust in the face of attacks target ing the route finding process (belonging to category I and detailed in Figure 2 ).
Furthermore, our second selection criteria is based on the strength of the security mechanism char acterized by the considered routing protocol. Based on security requirements, we focus on cryptography based approach which can be divided into two cate gories namely symmetric and asymmetric cryptogra phy. Our purpose is to measure security robustness of existing MANET routing protocols to face UAANET route discovery attacks. It is important to mention that we solely focus on cryptographic solutions, because our nodes (UAVs and GCS) are coming from the same manufacturer and as such there will be no selfish nodes within the network. Accordingly, the reputation-based or trust-based solutions are not taken into account in this work.
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Mechanismcomposition to design a Better Secure Routing Protocol for UAANET AODV -SEC [17] is a secure reactive ad hoc routing protocol based on AODV. It uses PKI, digital signatures and hash chain functions to ensure the au thentication and the integrity of messages. Moreover, it uses a specific certification type mCert [18] which contains only the relevant data of the certificate. This certificate is compatible with the X.509 standard and reduces the overhead by 50 % [19] .
Moreover, to guarantee the confidentiality of messages, we propose to combine the two cryptogra phy approaches (symmetric and asymmetric) as they are presented in the protocol MSAODV [20] . Until now this solution seemed robust and efficient but it is still vulnerable against Wormhole attack. To cope with this attack, we propose to add the Packet Leashes algorithm of the protocol TIK (TESLA with Instant Key Disclosure) [21] , said to be robust against Wormhole, Blackhole, Rushing and Spoofed attacks. This set of attacks represents the most important part of security vulnerabilities identified for the SUANET project and listed in Section II. TIK algorithm offers the possibility to calculate the expiration time and the distance traveled of the packets. This information is then included in the packets, so that the other UAVs can infer whether or not the packet has been altered. Typically, the Packet Leashes mechanism strengthens the authentication of the packet by putting additional information onto the packets in order to restrict maximum transmission of the packet. To implement this method, the TIK protocol which uses temporal leashes algorithm with packet expiration times is configured as a security metric. This metric is computed by taking into account the maximum distance that the packet should travel. Finally, we summarize the different security algorithms selected in our secure routing protocol in Table II . This set of mechanisms handle the dif ferent malicious attacks such as: Wormhole, Black hole, Rushing and Spoofed. It also deals with the following security services: authentication, integrity and confidentialy. Consequently, the different secu rity requirements of SUANET project are covered by this theoretical solution. It is important to note that the different mechanisms have been implemented through the MDD process previously described.
EnhancementProposition for VA V Secure Routing Protocol
In this section, we will detail the features of the secure routing protocol that we will deploy in the scope of the SUANET project. As stated previ ously, this protocol is essentially based on AODV, and combines some of the MSAODV and AODV SEC properties. Figure 8 summarizes the different components we propose to compose in order to design our new secure routing protocol for UAANET. 
Data Link and Medium Access 
PKI Implementation Assumptions
As already stated in the introduction, we also need to implement a PKI as a key management infras tructure. The principal objective for developing a PKI for U AANETs is to enable secure, convenient, and efficient acquisition of public keys between UAVs.
4A5-10
Such a key management scheme includes key distri bution and key revocation. The key distribution shares the secret keys to UAVs for secure communications, while the key revocation securely enl ists and removes compromised keys.
The prerequisites of implementing such an oper ation in SUANETs are :
• the presence of a CA (Certificate Authority) to manage the 1 ife-cycle of digital certificates;
• a distributed method for distributing CA capa bilities among entities;
• the security and availability of the CA to the nodes.
These prerequisites highlight the challenge of certificate distribution that we will encounter with application security within our future work.
Secure routing protocol implementation details
In this section, we will run through the method ology used to design our secure routing protocol. We will first present how we use the MDD methodology to develop the core of our routing protocol algorithm, and then we will give a detailed overview of how we intend to implement our secure routing protocol ex tension. It is important to remember that several steps have been carried out applying MDD methodology (as shown in Figure 6 ).
The first step is to validate our requirements specification. Since the AODV protocol was the most efficient in our realistic test scenario, our model re quirements are therefore mainly based on the AODV RFC specifications 1 0. Most of the main function alities have been modeled but there were a small number which were too complex to develop in high level modeling. We would prefer to directly add them during the glueing step (see step 4 described later in this section). It is important to note that the secure routing protocol functionalities is divided into three partitions to ease the modeling process: a partition to interface the high-level software with the kernel space;
11 a partition to handle information routing; 111 a security partition to protect network traffic. Figure 9 shows this segmentation. The routing and security partitions are developed with the MDD methodology, while the low-level network interface use III aeronau lca design of embedded systems. Consequently, at the end of this step, we obtained a model verified and validated.
Afterwards, the step 3 corresponds to the au tomatic generation of code. In this step we make use of the Embedded Coder tool offered by Matlab. Moreover, the verification of the source code, whether automatically or manually, requires a code review as part of the DO-l 78C recommendation. This operation is run automatically with Simulink Code Inspector toolbox. It compares the generated code with its source model to test specification conformances. The code inspector systematically examines blocks, state diagrams, parameters, and settings in the model to determine whether they are structurally equivalent to operations, operators, and data in the generated code. Ultimately, it generates a traceability documentation that can be used for certification purposes by certifi cation authorities.
The next step (called glueing) involves 1 inking the previously generated code with the kernel space. Generally, the glue code involves specifying how the generated code will exchange inputs and outputs with II can be seen in http://fr.mathworks.com/solutions/aerospace defense/standards/do-178c.html 4AS-ll the operating system (in our case Linux) kernel by calling the requested library functions. It also speci fies how the source code interacts with the different hooks of the Netfilter Linux module. This kernel communication interface can be manually written or automatically generated with a predefined tool. In order to ease this programming task, we decided to use a dedicated toolbox called Matlah S-Function l2 which is a descriptive language of Simulink blocks and allows us to integrate external C code into the model environment.
Afterwards, the fifth step is to generate the object code. This step is automated with Matlah Code Generation toolbox with an appropriate compiler in the program preferences. In our work, we decided to make use of the usual gcc compiler. However, when integrating the object into our specific embedded systems (Phytec ARM main board 1 3), it is necessary to cross-compile the software with cross-compiler and linker tools. Additionally, we have also been able to test the object code and achieve structural coverage between the model and the requirements. This task is automatically executed by the Matlah Model Coverage tool.
Finally, the last two steps involve compilation processes on the emulation tool (detail of the emu lation testbed in Section IV-B) and the Phytec ARM mainboard.
Furthermore, having explained how we have used the MDD methodology in our routing protocol design, we will detail how our selected security exten sion guarantees security requirements. As mentioned previously, the secure routing protocol we proposed in this paper is an improved security version of the well-known AODV protocol. It combines three secu rity mechanism (AODV-SEC, MSAODV and TIK) to provide comprehensive security solutions which guarantee authentication, integrity and confidentiality. In order to ensure these requirements are met, we use symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic methods. The set of cryptographic mechanisms is outline in Table II. 12 Mathworks online documentation: http://fr.mathworks.com/help/simulinklmatlab-s-functions-I.htm I l3 can be seen in http://www.phytec.in/
Solution for integrity
The one-way hash chain mechanism is used to ensure that important fields in AODV messages used to fmd and to maintain route (i.e. the hop count and the lifetime fields) could not be forged during transmission. This is an asymmetric cryptographic mechanism which has an irreversible function which helps to hide real information under a constant data length. For this purpose, the hash chain is used with a specific field as followed:
• Hop count: to prevent any malicious node pre senting itself as the best next hop;
• Lifetime: to prevent any malicious node invali dating a reliable route;
• Type: to prevent any malicious node modifying this field in order to automatically enable another node to reject packets 1 4.
Solution for Authentication
First and foremost, it is important to note that there are two types of authentication in traditional MANET architectures: node authentication and mes sage authentication. In the SVANET project, we focused on these two authentication services. On the one hand, the node authentication is used to ensure that each VA V and GCS is allowed to participate in the routing process. Among the multiple solutions found in the literature, one approach well suited to our project is to verify the node's identity (thanks to certificate verification) through a PKI. As previously mentioned, this point is part of our project objec tives but has yet to be tackled. On the other hand, message authentication is used to authenticate the message originator and also to provide a verification of message integrity. For this purpose, we use digital signatures (asymmetric cryptography mechanism) to protect the following fields of the different exchanged packets:
• Originator IP Address 
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It is important to mention that, as in [17] , we add a field called Packet signature 1 5 in order to allow the signature of the entire packet.
Moreover, to ensure that only authorized UA Vs and GCS can communicate within the UAANET, an hybrid encryption solution is used for authentication. We make the assumption that each UAV has a set of public and private keys given by a reliable and trusted PKI. We intend to implement them as follows: firstly, we perform a symmetric encryption during hello packet process. For this purpose, each UA V generates a set of hello packets for their respective neighbors and signs them with their respective private key. They also append their unique validated and updated certificate before sending them. Secondly, upon receiving such a packet, the receiving node uses its own private key to decrypt the packet and to verify the certificate of the transmitting node. If this certificate is valid, the current node marks the link through the sender as valid and then sends back a signed hello packet using the same method.
Solution for Confidentiality
We use a hybrid encryption for route discovery packets. For this purpose, a node starts by generating route request packets (as in the regular AODV mech anism) and then attaches signatures and certificates (as explained previously for the authentication and integrity services). Afterwards, it ciphers each packet with a random symmetric session key. Such a key is generated for each UA V and GCS during the ini tialization phase (on the ground and before the U A V flights). The next step is to encrypt this symmetric session key with the public key of each trusted node and finally to append it to the packet. After that, the originating node sends in unicast mode each message to the respective neighbors (according to each public key). Furthermore, on the other side of the network, upon reception of the packet, a node performs the re verse operation by first decrypting the symmetric key with the public key of the transmitting node. Finally, it decrypts the RREQ with a symmetric key. If these steps are followed correctly, it indicates that the node has the right to be in the network and therefore it can decrypt the message information. It can also process 15 For instance, for the RREQ packet, we add a new field called RREQ signature.
the packet by checking its authentication and integrity (as explained previously).
Solution for Wormhole Attacks
To counter this powerful attack, the Packet Leashes mechanism has been introduced in literature. It is important to note that, in order to get TIK algorithm executed properly, it is required that all UAVs and GCS share a common time reference (this is an additional implementation assumption to the PKI related assumptions listed in Section VI-A). This can be achieved through the available on-board embedded GPS devices on each UAV and GCS. Once this time is computed, we ensure its truthfulness by a digital signature as an authentication method.
To illustrate our approach, the following flow chart shows the sending request process and the receiving event process (Figures 10 and 11 ) . We only show the RREQ packet as it is the same for other types of AODV packets (i.e. RERR and RREP packets).
Conclusion and Future Research
In this paper, we have presented a new approach to secure a swarm of UAVs. We have detailed the specific features of UAANETs which make this new type of mobile ad hoc network very challenging to secure. From the routing point of view, many protocols which have been proposed for MANETs cannot be applied directly to UAANETs. Therefore, it is necessary to design new efficient routing protocols that appropriately address these high mobility features of UAANET. Accordingly, we have described the SUANET collaboration that we are currently work ing on to investigate the secure routing research field. Moreover, the MDD approach is used as a security architecture design tool to contribute to the certification of the fmal UAV communication sys tem. Furthermore, since the secure communication architecture has to provide confidentiality, authentica tion and integrity, the implementation of a PKI will be undertaken to attain these objectives by issuing, exchanging and revoking keys for the UAVs. We have introduced three complementary studies based on emulation testbed and literature-based evaluations helping us to choose AODV as the starting point of our process design in line with our project require ments. Based on this initial design choice we have been able to propose a new secure routing protocol which is a combination of different security mechanisms and which will be able to cope with the different vulnerabilities of UAANET.
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Authentlclltion
Integrity
Moreover, in regards of our short term perspec tives, we are currently working on testing the routing algorithm developed through MDD approach through an outdoor experiments involving 3 mini-UAVs and one GCS provided by the DELAIR TECH company. Once this task completed, we would like to add the quality of the wireless link between UAVs as a routing metric. This was not initially addressed because, we planned to deploy no more than 3 UAVs in the network. In this case, the usual hop count metric performs well with homogeneous single-radio environment. However, for future deployments, it can be possible to have more than 3 UAVs in a } c." "" ,,, .. } Authentication & Integrity Figure 11 . Flow Chart for Process Receive Event heterogeneous and multi-radio environment. In this situation, the hop count metric might not be accurate enough to find the best route. Subsequently, once this new routing metric properly configured, we would like to ensure its security to avoid any modification from adversary node. Accordingly, its integrity would be protected with a hash chain mechanism.
